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The first wave of globalization, lasting approximately from
1870 to 1913, included large flows of migration from Europe
to the countries of the New World. In the second
globalization wave of the late twentieth century, by contrast,
international migration was subject to more restrictive
immigration regimes, especially in the developed countries.
In Latin America, Argentina was the largest recipient of
European migrants during the first wave. About seven million
Europeans arrived in the country during that period,
responding to the attractive economic opportunities of the
Argentine belle époque of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. In the last decade of the twentieth
century, by contrast, Argentina became a country of net
emigration to the rest of the world, particularly where people
with a high level of education were concerned. This article
presents econometric estimates of migratory patterns to and
from Argentina in the twentieth century and analyses the
determinants of international migration flows in Latin
America generally, including intraregional immigration
patterns, particularly among neighbouring countries.
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I
Introduction
International labour markets are an essential part of the
globalization process. The first wave of globalization,
lasting roughly from 1870 to 1913, involved substantial
international population mobility, matching the
openness of goods and capital under the policy regime
of the gold standard and low tariffs. This process was
interrupted during the deglobalization period of 1914-
1945, which saw two world wars, high inflation in the
1920s, economic depression in the 1930s and political
destabilization. These events cut short the ever
increasing economic integration that had been occurring
in the world economy before 1914 and inaugurated a
long era of more restrictive migration policies. The
second wave of globalization in the late twentieth
century increased the degree of capital mobility and
international trade substantially. However, international
labour markets remain segmented, with international
migration constrained for unskilled labour and the poor,
chiefly in developed countries. In contrast, we live in a
world of high international mobility for individuals with
a large stock of human and financial capital (e.g.,
information technology experts, executives and
international investors).1
Large Latin American economies such as Argentina
(and to a lesser extent Brazil) received large flows of
migrants in the first globalization wave of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Foreign capital
and foreign labour moved in tandem to countries like
Argentina to capture the economic opportunities open
to them there at that time. As economic development
faltered in Argentina in the 1920s, and as Latin America
struggled to reach a level of development commensurate
with its resource potential, international migration from
Europe slowed down very significantly, virtually
ceasing in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Intra-Latin American migration developed in
response to significant differentials in per capita
income, particularly among countries sharing common
borders. At the same time Latin America, led by Mexico,
became the main source region for emigrants to the
United States, a trend that accelerated in the 1980s and
1990s and in the early twenty-first century.
This paper investigates the interaction among
globalization regimes, per capita income differentials
between countries and other factors in international
migration, with particular emphasis on the Latin
American experience. Following this introduction,
section II looks at different phases of globalization and
deglobalization in the world economy and at patterns
of international migration to and from Latin America,
all in the last 130 years or so. Section III examines the
role of different economic, social and political
determinants of migration, such as wage differentials
among countries, social support networks for migrants,
the state of the business cycle, migration costs,
migration policies and political regimes. Section IV
takes up the case of Argentina, historically one of the
main recipients of migrants in Latin America, but later
in the twentieth century a net emigration country,
particularly in the case of qualified human resources,
owing to its numerous economic crises compounded
by cycles of authoritarianism and political instability.
Econometric equations for migration to and from
Argentina are also presented. Section V offers some
conclusions.
1 See Solimano (2002), Carrington and Detragiache (1998) and
Haque and Kim (1994) for an analysis of human capital migration.
An early treatment appears in Adams (1964).
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II
International migration to
and from Latin America
The two globalization waves of the late nineteenth
century and the late twentieth century, and the
deglobalization period of 1913-1945, were major
economic events that significantly affected migration
flows around the world, and particularly in Latin
America. This section assess and interprets these
trends.
1. The first wave of globalization and the age
of mass migration (from about 1870 to 1913)
The period of free trade, free capital mobility and the
gold standard2  in the “global” economy from around
1870 to 1913 has been termed the “first wave of
globalization” by economic historians. This period was
also characterized by large flows of international
migration, causing it to become known as the “age of
mass migration” (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). It is
estimated that in this period some 60 million people
migrated from resource-scarce, labour-abundant
Europe to the resource-abundant, labour-scarce
countries of the New World, including Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States. Migrants came from both “core Europe”
(Britain, Germany, France) and “peripheral Europe”
(e.g., the Scandinavian countries, Spain, Italy and
Portugal, Poland, Russia, Rumania and the nations of
the former Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires).
In Latin America, the main destination country for
European migrants was Argentina, which received
nearly seven million (of whom about four million
returned to their home countries). Other countries that
received relatively large numbers of European migrants
were Uruguay, Cuba, Mexico and Chile.
Immigration policies in the New World countries
during the first wave of globalization3  were, on the
whole, liberal. Several of them (such as Argentina) set
up immigration agencies in European countries to
attract and facilitate immigration flows that would
increase the labour supply and support rapid economic
expansion. However, these policies became gradually
more restrictive, particularly in the 1910s and 1920s.
Ethnic discrimination (against migration from Asia,
particularly China) was a common practice in several
receiving countries, particularly English-speaking ones,
in the New World.
As table 1 shows, per capita income differentials
between peripheral Europe and the United States,
Canada, Australia and other New World countries in
the 1870-1913 period significantly favoured the latter,
encouraging large-scale trans-Atlantic migration. In
1913, per capita income was some 30% higher in
Argentina than in Spain and Italy, and this created a
strong economic incentive to emigrate there. Per capita
income in Uruguay was also higher than in Spain and
Italy in 1913, while in Chile it stood at about the same
level.
2. War, instability, depression and deglobalization
(1913-1945)
The outbreak of the First World War interrupted the
first wave of globalization and the integration of labour
markets across countries. In 1914 there began 30 years
of economic and political instability, chiefly in Europe,
which included the First World War, the very high
inflation of the 1920s, economic depression in the
1930s and then the Second World War. All this
turbulence led to increasingly restrictive international
migration policies. The United States enacted
immigration quotas in 1921 and 1924, reducing the
flow of immigrants from Europe. Migrants then
switched to Brazil and Argentina. The latter received
about three million immigrants from Europe in the
1920s, although as many as two million returned
(Chiswick and Hatton, 2002). At the same time,
emigration restrictions were enacted in the Soviet
Union, thus reducing Russia’s share of global
migration flows to the Americas.
2 See Eichengreen (1996) for an analysis of the gold standard in
this and subsequent periods.
3 Concerning immigration policies in the New World during the
first wave of globalization, see chiefly Timmer and Williamson
(1996). Holloway (1977) and Solberg (1970) deal more directly
with Brazil and with Argentina and Chile, respectively.
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3. The post-1950 period, the second wave
of globalization and continuing restrictions
on immigration
The end of the Second World War, the economic
reconstruction of Europe and the rebuilding of trade
and investment relations among nations in the second
half of the 1940s and early 1950s gave rise to a new
period of prosperity in the global economy. The
prevailing policy regime was a system of fixed exchange
rates among the main currencies, controlled
international capital markets and constrained
international migration. That cycle of prosperity and
stability lasted until the early 1970s, when industrial
countries were faced with the combination of the oil
price shocks and the collapse of the Bretton Woods
parities. These two shocks were followed by a new
period in the global economy. Economic
internationalization received a renewed impetus with
the emergence of an active international capital market
in the 1970s, culminating in the 1990s. The end of
Communism and growing liberalization of trade and
capital flows gave increased momentum to the “second
wave of globalization”. The increasing global
integration of goods and capital markets in this second
wave has not been followed, however, by an equal
degree of integration in international labour markets.4
TABLE 1
European, Latin American and other OECD
countries: Per capita GDP, 1820-2000
(1990 dollars)a
First wave of globalization, Second wave of globalization,
age of mass migration restricted migration
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1990 1998 2000
Europe
Italy 1 117 1 499 2 564 3 502 10 643 16 320 17 759 19 223
Spain 1 063 1 376 2 255 2 387 8 739 12 210 14 227 17 392
Portugal 963 997 1 244 2 069 7 343 10 852 12 929 15 295
Norway 1 104 1 432 2 501 5 463 11 246 18 470 23 660 29 523
Sweden 1 198 1 664 3 096 6 738 13 493 17 680 18 685 20 532
Average 1 089 1 394 2 332 4 032 10 293 15 106 17 452 20 393
Latin America
Argentina 1 311 3 797 4 987 7 973 6 512 9 219 8 645
Brazil 646 713 811 1 672 3 882 4 924 5 459 5 594
Chile 2 653 3 821 5 093 6 401 9 756 9 957
Colombia 1 236 2 153 3 499 4 822 5 317 5 044
Mexico 759 674 1 732 2 365 4 845 6 097 6 655 7 087
Peru 1 037 2 263 3 952 2 955 3 666 3 684
Uruguay 2 005 3 309 4 660 4 975 6 473 8 314 7 790
Venezuela 569 1 104 7 462 10 625 8 313 8 965 8 440
Average 703 1 054 1 960 3 673 5 606 5 812 7 169 7 030




Australia 517 3 645 5 715 7 493 12 759 17 043 20 390 22 461
Canada 893 1 695 4 447 7 437 13 838 18 933 20 559 23 682
New Zealand 400 2 704 5 152 8 453 12 513 13 825 14 779 16 068
United States 1 257 2 445 5 301 9 561 16 689 23 214 27 331 29 512
Average 767 2 622 5 154 8 236 13 950 18 254 20 765 22 931
Source: Maddison (2001) and IMF (various years).
a Adjusted for purchasing power parity.
4 See Abella (1997), Stalker (2000) and Solimano (2001).
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Restrictive immigration policies, particularly for the
low-skilled, are still the rule in the developed countries.
Immigration flows into Argentina (the main
recipient in Latin America) resumed after the Second
World War, in the mid-1940s, and lasted until the second
half of the 1950s, when Europe started to grow again
on a sustained basis. In Argentina, by contrast,
economic growth was modest in the 1950s, reducing
opportunities for both migrants and nationals. In 1950,
per capita income was still higher in Argentina, Uruguay
and Venezuela than in Italy, Spain and other peripheral
European countries, but the differential was shrinking
steadily, and by about 1970 the relationship had
reversed in the case of Argentina and Venezuela. As
will be shown later when the case of Argentina is
analysed in more detail, the main economic incentives
for emigration from Europe to Argentina virtually
disappeared in the 1970s. From then on, reverse
migration from Argentina to Italy and Spain was to be
the norm (Solimano, 2003).
In the first half of the twentieth century, migration
flows to Latin America from Europe coexisted with
emigration from various Latin America countries to the
United States, Canada and other developed nations.
Worldwide migration to the United States (table 2) rose
from one million people in the 1940s and two and a
half million in the 1950s to almost seven and a half
million on average in each of the 1980s and 1990s. It is
interesting to note that while in the nineteenth century
most migrants to the United States were Europeans
(some 88% of total migration in 1820-1920), the
percentage of European migrants declined to about 14%
in 1971-1998. In that period, the main source region
for immigration to the United States was Latin America
(46% of the total), followed by Asia (34%). In terms of
individual countries, over a long period of 179 years
from 1820 to 1998 (table 2) the main source countries
for migrants to the United States were Mexico, Cuba
and the Dominican Republic in Latin America, the
Philippines, China, Korea and India in Asia, and
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland in
Europe.5
a) Intra-Latin American migration
We have already highlighted the importance of
international differences in per capita incomes,
assuming a given set of immigration policies, in driving
migration flows. Table 3 shows significant differences
in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita among Latin
American countries in the period 1950-2000.6  In this
period, per capita income was more than twice as high
on average in Argentina as in Bolivia and Paraguay. As
a consequence of this gap, Paraguay and Bolivia became
the two main source countries for Latin American
immigration to Argentina (table 4). Per capita income
in Chile was 65% higher on average than in Peru (and
80% higher than in Ecuador), a gap that widened in the
1990s chiefly as a result of rapid growth in the Chilean
economy for most of the decade. The per capita income
differential between Venezuela and Colombia has
narrowed, owing to slower growth in the former over
the last two decades. An already significant per capita
income differential between Costa Rica and Nicaragua
has widened further since the 1980s, owing to the
collapse of the Nicaraguan economy during the civil
war of that decade and its very weak performance since.
The gap in income levels between the Dominican
Republic and Haiti widened sharply in the 1980s and
throughout the 1990s.
The important point here is that divergent economic
performance among Latin American countries,
particularly ones that share common borders, seems to
have led to significant migration flows among them.
Table 5 shows, for various census years, the stocks of
foreigners (born inside and outside the region) residing
in Latin American countries. This table shows that
Argentina has been the main recipient of people born
in other Latin American countries, both in absolute
numbers and as a share of its population, although the
trend is downward. In fact, the absolute number of
foreigners living in that country has been steadily
declining, dropping from about 2.5 million (12.7% of
the total population) in 1960 to about 1.6 million (4.9%
of the population) in 1991.7  Another country with a
large number of foreign-born residents is Venezuela,
where the figure rose from almost 600 thousand in 1971
to over a million in 1990. In the remaining countries
included in table 5, the percentage of foreign-born
residents recorded by censuses is relatively low. Still,
5 Immigration flows represented, on average, around 7% of the
total population of the United States in 1871-1920; the percentage
declined to 2.5% in the last third of the twentieth century. Illegal
immigration, meanwhile, is estimated to have increased
substantially during the 1990s, from 3.3 million in 1992 to 5 million
in 1996 (see Solimano, 2001, table 2). Mexico is the main source
country for illegal migrants to the United States. Other important
source countries for illegal immigrants are El Salvador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Canada and the Philippines.
6 In this article, GDP figures are used as per capita income
equivalents.





































































































United States: Immigration, by migrants’ region of origin and country of last residence,
fiscal years 1820-1998
Region/country 1820-1870a 1871-80 1881-90 1891-1900 1901-10 1911-20 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-98 Total: 179 years
of last residence 1820-1998b
Immigrants from all countries 7 377 238 2 812 191 5 246 613 3 687 564 8 795 386 5 735 811 4 107 209 528 431 1 035 039 2 515 479 3 321 677 4 493 314 7 338 062 7 605 068 64 599 082
U.S. population (mid-decade) 23 352 000 45 245 000 56 879 000 69 851 000 84 147 000 100 941 000 116 284 000 127 859 000 140 474 000 165 931 000 194 303 000 215 973 000 239 279 000 263 044 000 270 561 000
Immigrants/U.S. population (%) 31.6 6.2 9.2 5.3 10.5 5.7 3.5 0.40 0.70 1.50 1.70 2.10 3.10 2.90 23.90
Europe 6 717 328 2 271 925 4 735 484 3 555 352 8 056 040 4 321 887 2 463 194 347 566 621 147 1 325 727 1 123 492 800 368 761 550 1 132 002 38 233 062
Austriac 7 124 63 009 226 038 234 081 668 209 453 649 32 868 3 563 24 860 67 106 20 621 9 478 18 340 13 776 1 842 722
France 244 049 72 206 50 464 30 770 73 379 61 897 49 610 12 623 38 809 51 121 45 237 25 069 32 353 29 063 816 650
Germanyd 2 333 944 718 182 1 452 970 505 152 341 498 143 945 412 202 114 058 226 578 477 765 190 796 74 414 91 961 72 792 7 156 257
Hungary 484 9 960 127 681 181 288 808 511 442 693 30 680 7 861 3 469 36 637 5 401 6 550 6 545 7 564 1 675 324
Irelande 2 392 335 436 871 655 482 388 416 339 065 146 181 211 234 10 973 19 789 48 362 32 966 11 490 31 969 54 865 4 779 998
Italy 25 518 55 759 307 309 651 893 2 045 877 1 109 524 455 315 68 028 57 661 185 491 214 111 129 368 67 254 58 346 5 431 454
Soviet Unionf 3 886 39 284 213 282 505 290 1 597 306 921 201 61 742 1 370 571 671 2 465 38 961 57 677 386 327 3 830 033
Sweden … 115 922 391 776 226 266 249 534 95 074 97 249 3 960 10 665 21 697 17 116 6 531 11 018 10 325 1 257 133
United Kingdomg 1 401 213 548 043 807 357 271 538 525 950 341 408 339 570 31 572 139 306 202 824 213 822 137 374 159 173 128 671 5 247 821
Asia 106 529 124 160 69 942 74 862 323 543 247 236 112 059 16 595 37 028 153 249 427 642 1 588 178 2 738 157 2 346 751 8 365 931
Chinah 105 744 123 201 61 711 14 799 20 605 21 278 29 907 4 928 16 709 9 657 34 764 124 326 346 747 347 674 1 262 050
Hong Kongi … … … … … … … … … 15 541 75 007 113 467 98 215 96 047 398 277
India 196 163 269 68 4 713 2 082 1 886 496 1 761 1 973 27 189 164 134 250 786 295 633 751 349
Japan 186 149 2 270 25 942 129 797 83 837 33 462 1 948 1 555 46 250 39 988 49 775 47 085 55 442 517 686
Koreaj … … … … … … … … 107 6 231 34 526 267 638 333 746 136 651 778 899
Philippinesk … … … … … … … 528 4 691 19 307 98 376 354 987 548 764 433 768 1 460 421
Turkey 301 404 3 782 30 425 157 369 134 066 33 824 1 065 798 3 519 10 142 13 399 23 233 33 027 445 354
Vietnami … … … … … … … … … 335 4 340 172 820 280 782 241 641 699 918
America 349 171 404 044 426 967 38 972 361 888 1 143 671 1 516 716 160 037 354 804 996 944 1 716 374 1 982 735 3 615 225 3 777 281 16 844 829
Central America and Caribbean 50 596 14 114 29 446 33 615 115 740 140 583 90 668 21 363 71 390 167 842 571 543 875 766 1 340 139 1 245 292 4 768 097
Cubal … … … … … … 15 901 9 571 26 313 78 948 208 536 264 863 144 578 136 711 885 421
Dominican Republicm … … … … … … … 1 150 5 627 9 897 93 292 148 135 252 035 300 065 810 201
El Salvadorm … … … … … … … 673 5 132 5 895 14 992 34 436 213 539 179 050 453 717
Haitim … … … … … … … 191 911 4 442 34 499 56 335 138 379 141 181 375 938
Jamaican … … … … … … … … … 8 869 74 906 137 577 208 148 139 124 568 624
North America 290 977 388 802 395 217 4 282 228 868 961 189 1 383 802 130 846 232 307 677 763 867 247 810 233 1 812 781 2 088 801 10 273 115
Canada and Newfoundlando 271 020 383 640 393 304 3 311 179 226 742 185 924 515 108 527 171 718 377 952 413 310 169 939 156 938 157 564 4 453 149
Mexicop 19 957 5 162 1 913 971 49 642 219 004 459 287 22 319 60 589 299 811 453 937 640 294 1 655 843 1 931 237 5 819 966
South America 7 598 1 128 2 304 1 075 17 280 41 899 42 215 7 803 21 831 91 628 257 940 295 741 461 847 443 152 1 693 441
Argentinam … … … … … … … 1 349 3 338 19 486 49 721 29 897 27 327 22 581 153 699
Colombiam … … … … … … … 1 223 3 858 18 048 72 028 77 347 122 849 104 539 399 892
Ecuadorm … … … … … … … 337 2 417 9 841 36 780 50 077 56 315 60 031 215 798
Africa 648 358 857 350 7 368 8 443 6 286 1 750 7 367 14 092 28 954 80 779 176 893 280 230 614 375
Oceania 413 10 914 12 574 3 965 13 024 13 427 8 726 2 483 14 551 12 976 25 122 41 242 45 205 45 584 250 206
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service (2000) and Maddison (1995) for the United States population.
a The United States population figures for the 1820-1870 period are from 1850. b The population figure for the 1820-1998 period (last column) is from 1998. c The figures for Austria in
1938-1945 are included in those for Germany. d From 1899 to 1919, Poland is included with Germany. e Prior to 1926, Ireland includes Northern Ireland. f From 1899 to 1919, the Soviet
Union includes Poland. g From 1926, the United Kingdom includes England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. h From 1957, China includes Taiwan. i Data not reported separately
until 1932. j Data not reported separately until 1948. k Prior to 1934, Philippines recorded as insular travel. l Data not reported separately until 1925. m Data not reported separately until
1932. n Data for Jamaica not collected until 1953 (previously, consolidated under British West Indies). o Prior to 1920, Canada and Newfoundland were recorded as British North
America. From 1871 to 1898, figures include all British North America possessions. Land arrivals not completely enumerated until 1908. p No data available on Mexico for 1886 to
1894.
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it would be interesting to learn more about how these
trends developed in the 1990s as more recent census
figures become available.
b) Remittances
The financial counterpart of the physical movement
of people abroad (emigration) are the remittances sent back
home by the migrants. This underscores the fact that net
emigration is not in itself a pure cost for the sending
country; the accrual of remittances is a benefit of migration
that has to be weighed against its costs. The quantitative
significance of remittances to Latin America is high: the
2002 total is put at US$ 32 billion (MIF, 2003). To put this
number in perspective, foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Latin America was about US$ 39 billion that year and
official transfers were about US$ 3 billion (CEPAL, 2002).
The average share of remittances to GDP in 14 Latin
American countries in 2001 was 8.5%, although with large
variations among countries. Remittances represented
24.5% of GDP in Haiti, 17% in El Salvador, 15% in Jamaica
TABLE 3
Countries of Latin America: GDP per capita, 1950-2000
(1990 dollars)a
Countries
Years Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia Costa Dominican Ecuador Haiti Mexico Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Venezuela
Rica Republic
1950-1954 4 920 1 912 3 998 2 230 2 134 1 139 1 990 1 066 2 478 1 816 1 533 2 459 7 898
1955-1959 5 384 1 673 4 135 2 404 2 474 1 292 2 162 1 053 2 918 2 052 1 571 2 754 9 549
1960-1964 5 696 1 669 4 529 2 581 2 821 1 409 2 319 1 003 3 295 2 245 1 629 3 261 9 280
1965-1969 6 541 1 972 5 049 2 815 3 371 1 390 2 596 888 3 939 2 793 1 765 3 675 9 990
1970-1974 7 760 2 283 5 318 3 352 4 102 1 840 3 027 984 4 626 2 942 1 980 3 935 10 499
1975-1979 8 112 2 628 4 790 3 873 4 691 2 208 3 705 1 124 5 433 2 988 2 543 4 133 10 947
1980-1984 7 621 2 393 5 349 4 233 4 483 2 413 3 958 1 224 6 342 2 167 3 258 3 971 9 341
1985-1989 7 058 2 098 5 682 4 540 4 524 2 436 3 874 1 099 5 926 1 758 3 147 3 695 8 645
1990-1994 7 515 2 264 7 255 4 953 4 962 2 566 4 000 913 6 295 1 400 3 270 3 009 8 881
1995-2000 8 670 2 405 9 436 5 262 5 348 3 124 4 006 809 6 550 1 451 3 182 3 623 8 752
1950-2000 6 962 2 135 5 630 3 656 3 920 2 004 3 180 1 012 4 815 2 147 2 403 3 455 9 366
Source: Maddison (2001) and IMF (various years).
a Adjusted for purchasing power parity.
TABLE 4
Latin America and the Caribbean: Ratio of GDP per capita
in migrants’ countries of destination and origina
Destination Argentina Chile Venezuela Costa Rica Dominican Rep.
Origin Bolivia Chile Paraguay Peru Ecuador Colombia Nicaragua Haiti
1950-1954 2.58 1.23 3.21 1.63 2.01 3.54 1.18 1.07
1955-1959 3.23 1.30 3.43 1.50 1.91 3.97 1.21 1.23
1960-1964 3.42 1.26 3.50 1.39 1.95 3.60 1.26 1.41
1965-1969 3.32 1.30 3.71 1.37 1.94 3.55 1.21 1.57
1970-1974 3.40 1.46 3.92 1.35 1.77 3.14 1.39 1.87
1975-1979 3.09 1.71 3.22 1.16 1.29 2.83 1.62 1.97
1980-1984 3.19 1.43 2.34 1.35 1.35 2.21 2.07 1.97
1985-1989 3.37 1.25 2.25 1.56 1.46 1.91 2.61 2.22
1990-1994 3.31 1.04 2.30 2.41 1.81 1.79 3.55 2.86
1995-2000 3.60 0.92 2.73 2.60 2.36 1.66 3.69 3.86
1950-2000 3.26 1.28 3.05 1.65 1.80 2.80 2.01 2.04
Source: Maddison (2001) and IMF (various years).





































































































Countries of Latin America: Resident foreign population, census yearsa
Country of Year Population Total foreign- Country of birth
residence totalb born population Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia Costa Ecuador Haiti Nicaragua Paraguay Peru Dominican Venezuela Rest
Percentage Number Rica Republic of world
of total of people
population
Argentina 1960 20 010 539 12.7 2 540 226 88 830 116 840 1 138 209 617 30 53 153 844 5 164 76 991 2 172 34
1970 23 390 050 9.4 2 193 330 101 00 142 150 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 230 050 ND. N.A. N.A. 1 720 130
1980 27 947 446 6.61 1 857 703 115 616 207 176 1 864 N.A. 771 N.A. N.A. 259 449 8 002 N.A. 1 401 1 263 424
1991 32 615 528 4.9 1 605 871 143 735 218 217 2 638 451 975 73 142 251 130 15 977 259 1 934 970 340
Bolivia 1976 4 613 486 1.3 58 070 14 669 7 508 412 40 183 16 18 972 4 730 12 144 29 366
1992 6 420 792 0.9 59 807 17 829 3 909 529 83 243 5 54 955 5 805 36 300 30 059
Chile 1970  884 768 1.0 88 881 13 270 7 563 800 101 967 52 56 290 3 804 80 388 61 510
1982 11 329 736 0.7 84 345 19 733 6 298 1 069 191 1 215 36 99 284 4 308 73 942 50 097
1992 13 348 401 0.9 114 597 34 415 7 729 1 666 448 2 267 37 168 683 7 649 126 2 397 57 012
Colombia 1964b 17 484 508 0.4 74 055 1 190 N.A. 1 130 400 10 126 N.A. 272 N.A. 1 455 N.A. 16 224 43 258
1985b 27 837 932 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1993 33 109 840 0.3 106 162 1 953 390 1 496 452 9 040 64 307 137 3 182 47 43 285 45 809
Costa Rica 1963 1 336 274 2.6 34 981 144 N.A. 89 658 135 N.A. 18 368 N.A. N.A. N.A. 320 15 267
1973 1 871 780 2.5 46 077 347 87 670 1 014 272 25 23 331 31 315 55 435 19 495
1984 2 416 809 3.7 88 954 697 189 1 277 1 678 318 30 45 918 39 1 016 134 748 36 910
Ecuador 1982 8 060 712 0.9 75 404 1 691 381 5 747 39 443 280 22 142 85 1 887 102 1 674 23 950
1990 9 648 189 0.8 73 179 1 558 424 4 948 37 553 313 22 161 90 2 396 78 2 379 23 257
Haiti 1971 4 329 991 0.1 6 000 9 4 12 23 1 9 8 2 10 1 659 7 4 256
1982b 5 053 189 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Nicaragua 1971 1 877 952 1.1 21 174 107 N.A. 100 304 4 693 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 87 15 883
1995 4 357 099 0.6 26 043 147 38 115 237 4 727 78 20 10 176 52 116 20 327
Paraguay 1972 2 357 955 3.4 79 686 27 389 364 359 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 51 574
1982 3 029 830 5.5 166 879 43 336 500 1 715 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 121 328
1992 4 152 588 4.5 187 372 47 846 766 2 264 189 45 72 13 24 1 432 14 91 134 616
Peru 1972b 13 538 208 0.5 67 186 4 286 4 115 7 525 1 528 ... 2 399 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 47 333
1981 17 005 210 0.4 66 925 5 025 3 210 5 976 1 985 190 1 739 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 812 47 988
1993 22 048 356 0.2 52 725 4 165 3 216 4 652 2 374 215 1 801 15 135 194 104 1 489 34 365
Dominican 1970 4 009 458 0.8 32 419 213 21 47 120 40 57 19 065 15 4 345 114 12 378
Republic 1981b 5 545 741 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1993b 7 293 390 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Venezuela 1971 10 721 522 5.4 582 560 4 481 1 166 2 999 177 973 1 314 5 292 353 866 186 2 168 1 886 383 876
1981 14 516 735 7.2 1 048 159 11 371 2 301 24 703 494 494 1 795 21 091 1 238 2 187 456 19 956 15 745 452 822
1990 18 105 265 5.7 1 024 121 9 070 1 936 20 787 528 893 1 494 23 370 1 593 2 033 494 27 748 17 140 389 563
Source: ECLAC Investigation of International Migration in Latin America database.
a N.A.: Information not available in the ECLAC Population Division – Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE).
b Figures from census publications.
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and 9% in Ecuador, but less than 3% in Peru, Colombia,
Mexico and Brazil. As a share of exports, remittances were
equivalent to over 150% in Haiti, 80% in Nicaragua, 60%
in El Salvador and 20% in Ecuador (table 6). It is worth
noting that figures on remittances could be somewhat
understated, as transactions are often routed through
informal channels (e.g., carried by friends or relatives) or
go unrecorded. The macroeconomic and developmental
impact of remittances is favourable, as they supplement
domestic saving. Furthermore, the recipients are usually
low-income families in the migrants’ countries of origin
(Solimano, forthcoming).
III
Determinants of international migration
Having gone through the main trends of global and
regional migration to and from Latin America over
different periods of history, let us now review the main
economic determinants of migration and related topics.
1. Economic determinants of international
migration
One of the main reasons for people to migrate is the
expectation that they will earn more abroad than in their
home countries. There are also other variables that exert
an important influence on the decision to emigrate, such
as the state of the business cycle, the existence of social
networks that support migrants, migration policies and
costs, and war, ethnic discrimination and political
persecution at home.8
TABLE 6
Latin America and the Caribbean: Migrants’ remittances received in 2001
Remittances
Country Millions of dollars As percentage of GDP As percentage of exports
Mexico 9 273 1.7 6.5
Brazil 2 600 0.4 4.0
El Salvador 1 920 17.0 60.0
Dominican Republic 1 807 10.0 27.0
Ecuador 1 400 9.0 20.0
Jamaica 959 15.0 30.0
Cuba 930 5.0 40.0
Peru 905 1.7 10.6
Haiti 810 24.5 150.0
Colombia 670 0.0 2.4
Nicaragua 610 22.0 80.0
Guatemala 584 3.1 6.
Honduras 460 7.5 17.0
Bolivia 103 1.3 6.7
Total and averages 23 031a 8.5b 33.6b
Source: IMF (2003). The information for Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean was obtained from central banks. The figures for the
South American countries (Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador) probably understate the true amounts.
a Total for the countries.
b Average for the countries.
8 Migration equations usually include the following variables as
determinants of the migration rate: the ratio between real wages
(or real per capita income) in the home and destination countries; a
lagged migration variable capturing friends and relatives effects
(social networks) in the destination country; a two-decades lagged
demographic variable representing population growth in the home
country, and a variable denoting the degree of industrialization in
the home country (O’Rourke and Williamson, 2000).
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The magnitude and direction of international
migration are often influenced by the following factors.
a) Per capita income or real wage differentials
between sending and receiving countries
Net immigration flows (immigration minus
emigration) are positively correlated with the ratio
between real per capita income (or real wages) in the
destination country and real per capita income (or real
wages) in the source country.9  Taking into account
uncertainty, the relevant variable is the income expected
in the place of destination compared with the income
expected in the home country. In a dynamic,
intertemporal specification, the most relevant variable
would be the present value of the difference in expected
relative earnings streams between the recipient country
and the home country.
b) The state of the business cycle and economic
prospects in the sending and receiving countries
Rapid economic growth and labour shortages in
receiving countries tend to increase the likelihood that
immigrants will find work. Conversely, in periods of
sluggish growth and higher unemployment there is less
likelihood of this. While the decision to emigrate
depends largely on per capita income differentials
across countries, the timing of migration is correlated
with the state of the business cycle in the sending and
receiving countries
c) Network effects
Empirical analysis of migration flows (Hatton and
Williamson, 1998; Borjas, 1999) shows that migrants
tend to attach a high value to the presence of friends
and relatives as a factor in their choice of destination
country. In fact, family, friends and ethnic/nationals
networks can serve as a support system, helping them
to get information about jobs and other relevant host
nation characteristics and thus facilitating individual
and family adjustment after migration.
d) Immigration policies
If migration policies in host countries are restrictive
they will deter immigration, although not completely,
as there is always illegal migration to some countries.10
A distinction should be drawn here between the desire
to migrate and the ability to do so.
e) Migration costs
These include travel costs, airline or other tickets,
shipping costs and living expenses in the host country,
besides the costs of looking for work. Unskilled and
poor migrants tend to be most affected by these costs,
which often inhibit them from migrating across borders.
The poorest are usually not the ones who emigrate, as
they cannot afford it.
f) Cultural differences across countries
Features such as language, traditions and family
relationships affect migration patterns. As these cultural
traits are often different in the host country and the
sending country, they tend to act as a brake on
international migration.
g) Geographical distance or proximity
In general, immigration to neighbouring or nearby
countries is higher than immigration to further-off
countries: geography affects the direction and size of
emigration flows.
2. Political regimes and international migration
Outflows and inflows of people do not only depend on
economic considerations. The political regimes
prevailing in host and source countries –democracy or
authoritarianism– also matter in the decision to
emigrate. Individuals will usually prefer to live in
countries where civic freedoms and individual rights
(freedom of speech and association, access to fair trial,
religious freedom, right to elect public authorities, etc.)
are respected and economic rights (property rights,
contract enforcement) are protected. This tends to occur
more often in democracies than in dictatorships, as the
latter tend to curtail individual rights.11  In his classic
book Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Albert Hirschman draws
a distinction –useful for an understanding of the
economic and political causes of migration– between
purely economic choices and collective action. While
“exit” is often an economic decision, “voice” belongs
to the realm of collective or political action (Hirschman,
9 See Hatton and Williamson (1998, chapters 3 and 4) for a detailed
discussion of the impact of per capita income gaps on emigration
flows from Europe to New World countries in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The role of per capita income gaps
on migratory flows to and from Argentina is examined in section
IV and in Solimano (2003).
10 See Chiswick and Hatton (2002) for an interesting analysis of
migration policies in receiving countries.
11 See Olson (2000) for an insightful analysis of the economic
consequences of democracies and autocracies.
63C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 0  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 3
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE  •  ANDRÉS SOLIMANO
1972). This framework suggests that individuals who
are unsatisfied or discontented with current political
and economic conditions in their home countries, but
find that “voice” (i.e., collective action) has become an
ineffective expedient to change things, may choose to
exit their countries (i.e., to emigrate). Thus, the decision
to emigrate voluntarily (unlike the problem of refugees
and asylum, which are instances of forced migration)
is also affected by the perception that nationals or
foreign residents have of the quality of the political
regime in the country of residence or destination. This
suggests a direct relationship between the emigration
of nationals (or the repatriation of foreigners) and the
existence of authoritarian regimes that suppress political
rights and civil liberties. There are several Latin
American examples that illustrate this: the
establishment of military regimes in Argentina in the
1960s and 1970s that curtailed civil liberties and
interfered with the universities, where they suppressed
academic freedoms, was followed by a massive outflow
of professionals and scientists, a brain drain that had
serious consequences for the country. A similar situation
arose under authoritarian regimes in Brazil in the 1960s
and 1970s, and in Chile in the 1970s and 1980s. In
these cases, emigration (very often of individuals with
a high stock of human capital) became an individual
response to non-democratic political regimes that failed
to respect civic rights.
IV
From net immigration to net emigration: Argentina
in the twentieth century
1. Economic and political developments
in Argentina
Having been one of the six most developed economies
in the world in the late 1920s, by the last quarter of the
twentieth century Argentina ranked among the middle-
income economies of the developing world. As a
consequence of this, a country which from 1870 to the
1950s had been a net “importer” of people, mainly from
Europe, became a net “exporter” –often of highly
educated citizens– in the last decades of the twentieth
century.
The economic development process in Argentina
went through different phases and cycles that, over time,
started to diverge from those of the best performers of
the world economy. The 1870-1914 period, which
economic historians have dubbed Argentina’s belle
époque,12  was characterized by rapid economic growth,
large inflows of foreign capital and, as mentioned
before, mass immigration from Europe, the main source
countries being Italy and Spain, which accounted for
nearly 80% of total migration to the country (Bunge
and Garcia Matta, 1969). In this period, which
coincided with the “first wave of globalization”,13  the
Argentine economy grew at 6% a year and per capita
income was 33% higher than in Spain and 38 % higher
than in Italy (table 7).
As mentioned earlier, migration policies in
Argentina were designed to actively recruit migrants
abroad. In the mid-nineteenth century, the government
opened recruitment offices in Italy and Spain, and
immigrants from those countries had their travel costs
paid and were provided with housing and land grants.
This strategy helped attract massive international
migration to Argentina in 1870-1914.
In that period, net immigration (immigrants minus
emigrants) to Argentina averaged about 57,000 people a
year, giving a net migration rate of about 15 per 1,000
(table 7). Net immigration fell in the early inter-war years
(1914 to 1929) to about 40,000 a year, or around half
the 1900-1914 figure. Those years were highly disruptive
for the world economy, and Argentina was not immune
to that situation. Ongoing disorganization in world capital
markets and disruption in European import markets
restricted the country’s access to external financing and
constrained export opportunities.14  Migration flows were
12 See Diaz Alejandro (1970), Bunge and Garcia Matta (1969),
Cortés Conde (1979), Taylor (1994b) and Solberg (1978).
13 See Della Paolera (1994).





































































































Argentina: Economic periods and international migration, 1870-2000
Period Net migrationa Total population Average Argentina GDP per capita ratio between Argentina and other countries
Annual average Rateb (annual average, annual GDP (index 1990=100) U.S.c Spainc Italyc OECDc Boliviad Chiled Paraguayd
Global integration (number of (per thousand thousands of growth (%)
and growth people) population) people)
(Belle Epoque)
1870-1900 33 962.0 11.5 3 037.8 6.2e 35.4e 0.58 1.17 1.28 0.78 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1900-1914 103 786.7 17.0 6 183.6 4.3 52.0 0.68 1.65 1.62 1.06 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1870-1914 56 957.9 15.1 4 049.6 5.9e 41.6e 0.61 1.33 1.38 0.87 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Early inter-war years
1914-1929 40 436.5 4.4 9 479.9 3.8 55.7 0.59 1.53 1.32 0.99 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Import substitution
development strategy
1930-1940 21 945.0 1.7 13 053.9 1.5 60.1 0.64 1.66 1.30 0.93 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1940-1950 47 752.1 3.1 15 490.5 3.7 70.9 0.47 2.01 1.65 0.94 N.A. N.A. N.A.
1950-1960 60 158.2 3.2 18 891.8 2.9 79.6 0.46 1.76 1.17 0.80 2.96 1.27 3.34
1960-1970 32 969.3 1.5 22 277.1 4.7 95.4 0.45 1.27 0.83 0.68 3.37 1.29 3.63
1970-1975 57 986.1 2.8 26 030.9 4.2 119.7 0.47 0.97 0.78 0.66 3.37 1.53 3.88
1930-1975 41 268.5 2.3 18 280.7 3.3 81.4 0.50 1.58 1.19 0.82 3.19f 1.33f 3.56f
Early economic liberalization
1975-1990 -1 387.5 -0.05 29 244.75 0.1 115.6 0.38 0.78 0.58 0.52 3.21 1.43 2.57
Economic reform
and liberalization
1990-2000 -2 155.3 -0.1 34 732.1 3.6 122.2 0.32 0.62 0.48 0.44 3.47 0.97 2.53
1975-2000 -1 683 -0.05 31 439.35 1.6 119.0 0.36 0.72 0.55 0.49 3.33 1.25 2.57
1870-2000 (average) 9 685 6.4 18 503.3 3.9e 44.5e 0.50 1.37 1.11 0.80 3.26f 1.28f 3.05f
Source: Solimano (2002b)
a Net immigration = Immigration - emigration.
b Average net migration / population in middle year of period.
c 1990 dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity.
d Constant 1995 dollars.
e Since 1875.
f Since 1950.
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driven by the combination of diminished economic
opportunities in Spain and Italy and the abundance of
land, the scarcity of labour and the dynamism of the meat
and grain export industry, largely oriented towards the
British market, that then existed in Argentina. Foreign
capital provided the resources needed to build and
upgrade infrastructure such as railways, ports and roads,
and foreign immigration supplied the labour and
entrepreneurialism required to seize those opportunities.
The 1930s were bad years for the Argentine
economy, with GDP growth declining to an annual rate
of 1.5%.15  Like other Latin American economies at
that time, Argentina adopted an inward-looking
development strategy in the early 1930s, raising tariffs
on imports of intermediate and capital goods.16  The
economic decline in Argentina also resulted in net
immigration flows into the country falling sharply to
about 22,000 immigrants a year between 1930 and
1940. After the Second World War there was a
resumption in European migration to Argentina, and
this lasted until the mid-1950s. The human and
economic devastation brought about by that war drove
Europeans to leave their home countries, and Argentina
was a natural destination because of the existing ties
and knowledge of the country built up during the large
migration waves of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
In the late 1940s and the 1950s, however, the
combination of rapid economic recovery in Europe and
a lagging economic performance in Argentina steadily
closed the per capita income gaps between Argentina
and European countries and thus reduced the incentives
for immigration to the country from Europe, which
declined sharply in the 1960s (table 7) and almost dried
up in the 1970s and 1980s.17
Coinciding with the decline in immigration from
Europe, the 1950s saw an increase in international
migration to Argentina from neighbouring countries.
As mentioned in section II, there were considerable
flows, mainly of rural workers and unskilled urban
labourers from Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile.18  In
addition to this change in the source countries for
migration to Argentina, large-scale internal migration
from rural areas to cities had begun in the 1930s,
associated with import substitution industrialization, the
growth of government and ever increasing urbanization.
Immigrants from neighbouring countries went to do
jobs in rural areas that had been relinquished by
Argentine workers moving to the cities. Another
important trend in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was the
emigration of Argentines, particularly highly skilled
professionals, scientists and intellectuals.19  Besides
economic decline, this emigration was largely driven
by the policies of the Perón administrations, which
discriminated against non-Peronist intellectuals and
professionals in the 1950s, and the open hostility of
the military regimes to dissent in the universities in the
1960s and 1970s. This situation reached a dramatic
climax in 1967 under the Government of general Juan
Carlos Onganía, when State intervention in the
University of Buenos Aires alone resulted in the
expulsion of 1,305 faculty members (Lattes, Oteiza and
Graciarena, 1986). This was followed by a brain drain:
intellectuals started to leave Argentina because of the
risk of dismissal and possibly imprisonment, and
because budget cuts in the universities were
undermining scientific research and teaching work.20
After a period of democratic government in the early
1970s, the situation worsened again after the military
coup of 1976. In its effort to consolidate power, the
regime implemented a general strategy of repressing
any potential opponent, including a massive “purge”
of scientists, professionals and students.21
2. Econometric estimates
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, economic
stagnation and instability combined with cycles of
15 See Della Paolera and Taylor (1998) and Diaz-Alejandro (1970)
for an analysis of the impact of the external shocks of the 1930s
and Argentina’s policy response.
16 Diaz-Alejandro (1970) and Taylor (1994a) have shown that the
import substitution policies adopted in the 1930s in Argentina
contributed significantly to higher relative prices for capital goods
in the country, thereby discouraging capital formation and growth.
17 As a consequence of this reversal, in 1975-2000 Argentina’s per
capita GDP averaged only 72% of Spain’s and 55% of Italy’s
(table 7).
18 Paraguayans and Bolivians mainly went to the north of Argentina,
while most Chilean immigrants went to agricultural estates in the
south and the oil fields of Patagonia.
19 See Lattes, Oteiza and Graciarena (1986) for statistics on the
emigration of Argentine doctors, engineers, scientists and
technicians to the Unites States between 1950 and 1970.
20 The case of César Milstein is telling. This outstanding Argentine
scientist emigrated from Argentina and went to work in the
University of Cambridge. A few years later, he was awarded the
Nobel Prize while still abroad.
21 The military authorities kept virtually no records of the outflow
of Argentines between 1976 and 1981, and this empirical problem
makes it difficult to understand the effects of events in this period
on migration flows.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 0  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 366
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE  •  ANDRÉS SOLIMANO
political authoritarianism to turn Argentina into a
country of net emigration to the rest of the world. From
the 1950s onward, volatile growth and macroeconomic
instability (partially and briefly reversed in the 1990s)
clearly weakened the strong economic incentives for
immigration that had existed in Argentina in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Populist-
nationalist governments and repressive military regimes
also helped discourage immigration from Europe22  and,
as we have seen, the military regimes23  compelled many
of the best qualified and hence most mobile Argentines
to leave the country at different times during the second
half of the twentieth century.
Solimano (2003) provides econometric estimates
of the economic and political determinants of net
immigration into Argentina during the twentieth
century, for various subperiods24  and for the whole of
the 1990-1999 period. The main results of this study
can be summarized as follows:
i) The per capita income gap between Argentina
and the source countries (chiefly Europe until the mid-
1950s and Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile thereafter) has
had a statistically significant effect on net migration
(immigration minus emigration) to and from Argentina.
The econometric results show the per capita income gaps
between Argentina and source countries to be a robust
determinant of net immigration in the different subperiods
of the twentieth century. This also confirms the important
role of relative income differentials in driving
international migration, as discussed in section III.
ii) The econometric results also show that
authoritarian regimes have had a statistically significant
negative effect on immigration into Argentina (and a
positive effect on emigration from Argentina),
confirming the importance of political regimes, and
more specifically the suppression of civil and academic
liberties and the violation of human rights by
dictatorships, as determinants of migration decisions.
This effect seems to be greatest in the case of skilled
people with a large stock of human capital, who are
more mobile and can afford to migrate to other
countries.
22 These political features of Argentina do not seem to have deterred
immigration from Bolivia or Paraguay, which had their own share
of authoritarian regimes.
23 From the early 1930s until the early 1980s, Argentina had a
history of considerable political instability with frequent changes
between democratic and authoritarian regimes. The replacement
of democratically elected governments by authoritarian regimes
started with José Uriburu in 1930 (replacing the democratic
government of Hipólito Irigoyen) and ended with the military
regime of general Galtieri in 1983, when the election of President
Raúl Alfonsín inaugurated a cycle of democratic governments that
so far has lasted about 20 years.
24 The results of the regressions are given in appendix A.
V
Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that international migration
burgeoned during the first wave of globalization (from
about 1870 to 1913) as capital and goods markets
became increasingly integrated in the context of an open
global economy and a monetary system based on the
gold standard. This situation came to an end during the
deglobalization period that ran from 1914 until the mid
to late 1940s, and that included two world wars,
macroeconomic instability in the 1920s, economic
depression in the 1930s and recurrent political
turbulence. All this created a climate conducive to a
more restrictive regime of international migration.
International labour markets have remained
segmented in the second wave of globalization that
began in the 1970s, with restrictive immigration
policies, particularly for unskilled labour, in the more
developed economies. However, people with more skills
and a high level of education (professionals, information
technology experts, international investors) have
become far more internationally mobile as globalization
in capital and goods markets has increased.
International migration to and from Latin America
has been driven mainly by per capita income differences
between the region and the rest of the world. Likewise,
intraregional migration has reflected per capita income
disparities among countries in Latin America. South-
north migration to the United States has been dominated
by Mexico and other Central American and Caribbean
countries. Argentina was a major destination country
for migrant European labour during the age of mass
migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
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centuries. However, as economic growth in Argentina
slowed down and became more unstable from the 1930s
onward, opportunities for migrants from Europe
declined, and in the late 1950s this source of migration
virtually disappeared. It was replaced by migration from
neighbouring countries with lower per capita incomes,
mainly Paraguay and Bolivia. In the second half of the
twentieth century, furthermore, emigrants from
Argentina (chiefly professionals and highly qualified
people) outnumbered immigrants as persistent
economic instability came to be compounded by
political authoritarianism, especially in the 1960s and
1970s.
A time series econometric analysis of migration
to and from Argentina shows the importance for net
immigration rates of income gaps between Argentina
and sending nations. This finding is robust for various
subperiods of the twentieth century. As mentioned
earlier, the empirical analysis also finds that
authoritarian regimes have had a negative impact on





Immigration minus emigration per thousand population.
Argentina’s per capita GDP
Millions of 1990 dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity (Geary-Khamis method) / population of Argentina
in thousands at mid-year.
Europe’s per capita GDP
Millions of 1990 dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity (Geary-Khamis method) / population in thousands
at mid-year.
i) Europe’s per capita GDP (1900-1929, 1900-1999) = 1/3 [1/6 (GDP per capita of Austria + GDP per capita of
Belgium + GDP per capita of France + GDP per capita of Germany + GDP per capita of Switzerland + GDP per capita
of UK)] +1/3 GDP per capita of Spain +1/3 GDP per capita of Italy.
Change in weights reflects decline in importance of Italy and Spain as source of immigration to Argentina.
ii) Europe’s GDP per capita (1929-1960, 1960-1999) = 1/8 [ GDP per capita of Austria + GDP per capita of
Belgium + GDP per capita of France + GDP per capita of Germany + GDP per capita of Switzerland + GDP per capita
of UK + GDP per capita of Spain + GDP per capita of Italy].
Per capita GDP in countries neighbouring Argentina
Millions of 1995 dollars / population in thousands at mid-year.
GDP per capita (1950-2000) of neighbouring countries = 1/3 [GDP per capita of Bolivia + GDP per capita of Chile
+ GDP per capita of Paraguay].
Cyclical GDP index
Ratio of actual GDP to trend GDP in Argentina, both in millions of 1990 dollars adjusted for purchasing power
parity (Geary-Khamis method).
Trend GDP for Argentina was constructed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Political regime index





































































































Argentina: Econometric estimates of net immigration equations.
Dependent variable: Net migration ratea
(per thousand inhabitants)
1990-1929 1929-1960 1960-1999 1900-1999 (3-year average)
[1] [2] [3] [1] [2] [3] [4] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 3.89 -14.86 -16.81 0.55 0.07 0.64 0.90 -20.51 -21.15 -25.31 -40.52 -58.85 -56.08 3.76 5.55 6.41 6.27
[2.46] [-3.96] [-2.97] [1.33] [0.16] [1.83] [2.43] [-3.20] [-3.44] [-3.50] [-4.98] [-1.50] [-1.36] [3.30] [7.33] [8.11] [5.52]
One lag 0.6 0.20 0.20 0.74 0.73 0.65 0.63 -0.27 -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 0.02
Net migration (-1) [6.20] [1.74] [1.43] [6.91] [7.50] [8.31] [8.23] [-1.38] [-1.83] [-1.80] [-1.76] [0.18]
Two lags -0.54 -0.49 0.50
Net migration (-2) [-2.79] [-2.23] [-2.20]
Logarithm of Argentina’s 79.96 86.68 5.58 2.74 2.97 -6.49 -5.78 9.53 10.46 10.67 10.36
per capita GDP over [5.08] [4.02] [2.69] [1.59] [1.77] [-0.47] [-0.41] [3.20] [5.63] [6.18] [4.68]
Europe’s per capita GDPb
Logarithm of Argentina’s
per capita GDP over neighbouring
countries’ per capita GDPb
Logarithm of Argentina’s -11.16 22.86 21.32 27.46 27.51 34.12 41.68 41.27 55.43 54.24 53.48
cyclical GDP indexb [-0.46] [4.51] [4.27] [1.81] [1.85] [2.36] [1.92] [1.85] [6.81] [7.18] [5.67]
Political regime indexb -0.75 0.60 -3.55 -3.39
[-1.70] [0.38] [-2.37] [-2.00]
R2 0.40 0.76 0.76 0.61 0.69 0.82 0.83 0.29 0.37 0.43 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.26 0.72 0.77 0.76
Durbin-Watson 0.62 1.10 1.71 2.91 2.48 1.32 1.18 2.5c 2.7c 1.57d -1e -0.87e 0.40e 0.92c 1.64c 1.99c 0.16d
autocorrelation statistic
Number of observations 30 30 30 32 32 32 32 32 32 30 28 28 28 31 31 31 30
Source:  Solimano (2002b).
a Net migration rate = immigration minus emigration per thousand population.
 Method of estimation: ordinary least squares (OLS). Values in brackets are Student t-statistics.
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